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Abstract
Numerous experiments have demonstrated the possibility of attitude polarization.
For instance, Lord, Ross & Lepper (1979) partitioned subjects into two groups, ac-
cording to whether or not they believed the death penalty had a deterrent e¤ect, and
presented them with a set of studies on the issue. Believers and skeptics both become
more convinced of their initial views; that is, the population polarized. Many schol-
ars have concluded that attitude polarization shows that people process information
in a biased manner. We argue that not only is attitude polarization consistent with
an unbiased evaluation of evidence, it is to be expected in many circumstances where
it arises. At the same time, some experiments do not nd polarization, under the
conditions in which our theory predicts the absence of polarization.
Keywords: Attitude Polarization; Conrmation Bias; Bayesian Decision Making.
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: D11, D12, D82, D83
According to Gallup surveys, since the early 1990s around 68% of African Americans
have held the view that the American justice system is biased against blacks. During the
same time period, the percentage of whites who share this belief has dropped from 33% to
25%.1 Moving from beliefs to data, several studies have conrmed what many people have
long suspected that police stop and friskracial and ethnic minority members at higher
rates than whites (See Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss (2007)). What impact can these studies be
expected to have, or to have had, on the views of blacks and whites on the American justice
system?
More generally, how should we expect groups of people with di¤ering opinions on an
issue to react to the same piece of information? In a classic study, Lord, Ross and Lepper
We thank Gabriel Illanes and Oleg Rubanov for outstanding research assistance. We also thank Vijay
Krishna, Michael Mandler, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Debraj Ray, Jana Rodríguez-Hertz, and Andrew Scott for
valuable comments.
1http://www.gallup.com/poll/163610/gulf-grows-black-white-views-justice-system-bias.aspx. See The
Sentencing Project (2014) for a discussion of this and related results.
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(1979) took two groups of subjects, one which believed in the deterrent e¤ect of the death
penalty and one which doubted it, and presented them with the same mixed evidence on the
issue. Both groups became more convinced of their initial positions. Numerous, though not
all, subsequent experiments on a variety of issues, have also found that exposing people who
disagree to the same mixed evidence may cause their initial attitudes to move further apart,
or polarize.2 Many scholars have concluded that these results provide evidence that people
process information in a biased manner to support their pre-existing views.
In this paper, we argue that, on the contrary, this polarization of attitudes is often exactly
what we should expect to nd in a perfectly rational unbiased population. Our argument
consists of two parts. First of all, the mere fact that some peoples opinions move further
apart following common information is perfectly consistent with Bayesian updating and not
particularly surprising. That is, two people polarizing is not evidence of biased reasoning.
This observation has been made by others as well and we discuss their work in Section
3. However, the crux of the literature on attitude polarization is not about some peoples
opinions moving further apart, but, rather, the systematic polarization of the population.
The second, more important, part of our argument is that when the mixed information
that people are presented with is, in some sense, typical evidence, as is often the case in
experiments, one should expect the views of people on either side of an issue to strengthen,
so that the population on the whole polarizes. When the information is not typical, one
should not expect the population to polarize, as some experiments nd. Our model also
predicts other empirical patterns that have been noted.
Although several authors have argued that Bayesian reasoning is consistent with individ-
uals polarizing, no one previously has explained population polarization in a fully rational
framework. Still, while we develop our ideas in a rational setting, our interest is not in
rationality per se, but the extent to which attitude polarization is consistent with, and
even predicted by, unbiased reasoning. Full rationality provides a convenient benchmark of
unbiased reasoning.
In the next section, we give a detailed informal exposition of our reasoning, including
a simple numerical example in Section 1.1. In Section 2, we present a formal model that
demonstrates group polarization; in Section 2.1 we provide conditions under which we would
not expect groups to polarize; in Section 2.2 we characterize the conditions under which
two individuals can polarize. In Section 3 we discuss the relationship of our work to the
theoretical literature on attitude polarization and take a critical look at some experimental
2Papers on attitude polarization include Darley and Gross (1983), Plous (1991), Miller, McHoskey, Bane,
and Dowd (1993), Kuhn and Lao (1996), and Munro and Ditto (1997). Some experiments track both peoples
normative opinions (e.g., are you in favour of capital punishment?) and positive beliefs (e.g., do you believe
capital punishment has a deterrent e¤ect?). Throughout this paper, we only discuss movements in positive
beliefs, as it is unclear how to evaluate changes in normative opinions.
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ndings. The appendix examines some nuances of polarization and contains all proofs.
1 The Basic Reasoning
Our starting point is an experiment in which subjects are twice asked to indicate their
opinions on an issue. For instance, they may be asked to indicate the extent to which they
believe that nuclear energy is safe, on a scale from -8 (completely safe) to 8 (not safe at all).
Individuals arrive at the experiment with personal information from their own experience,
and, depending on the particular experiment, before being asked to choose a number the rst
time, they may also be given di¤ering pieces of information. In any case, before being asked
their opinions a second time, all subjects are supplied with a common piece of information.
As an example, in a study by Darley and Gross (1983), subjects were presented with a
description of a fourth-grade girl named Hannah. The subjects were partitioned into two
groups, one of which was given information strongly suggesting that Hannah came from an
upper class background and one of which was given information suggesting that she came
from a lower class background  information that could potentially have a biasing e¤ect
on the way they processed subsequent information. At that point, the subjects were asked
several questions about Hannah, among them to indicate at what grade level they believed
she was actually functioning in mathematics, liberal arts, and reading. Subjects gave their
answers on a scale that went from 0 (kindergarten) to 6:75 (sixth grade, nine months).
Subjects who believed that Hannah came from a well-o¤ family tended to rate her grade
level in these three disciplines as slightly higher than those who believed she came from a
poorer family.
Next, subjects were provided with some specic evidence about Hannahs abilities. This
evidence was the same for all the subjects. They were then again asked to rate her.3 On
average, the subjects who believed that Hannah was well-o¤ and who had initially rated her
higher, revised their estimates upwards, while the complementary group revised downwards.
Notice that i) some subjects reacted positively to the additional information while others
reacted negatively and ii) the di¤erence in reaction was not distributed randomly among
subjects.
To evaluate these ndings, we start by considering two subjects, A and B, such that
As initial response was greater than Bs. We will use the terms below to describe the
di¤erent ways in which A and Bs answers might move relative to each other after receiving
3Actually, in the experiment one group of subjects was given only demographic information, while another
group was given both demographic information and additional common information. The two groups were
presumed to be more or less identical a priori, and the results are universally interpreted to represent changes
in responses following the additional information, while avoiding anchoring e¤ects.
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additional common information. (For ease of exposition, we assume that the responses of
both individuals change. A formal denition of polarizing is given in the next section.)
Denition 1 Suppose that As initial response is greater than Bs. Following a common
piece of information,
A and B harmonize if their responses both rise or both fall.
A and B moderate if As response falls towards Bs and Bs response rises towards As.
A and B polarize if As response rises and Bs response falls.
For concreteness, suppose that As initial response was 4:25, while Bs was 3:75. Which
type of response movement would seem, potentially at least, to be problematic? Trivially,
neither harmonization nor moderation pose a problem. Indeed, if the common information
was that a battery of reliable tests established Hannah to be operating at the level of a
fth grader, we would expect the responses to harmonize upwards towards 5, whereas if the
information was that the tests established her level to be that of a beginning fourth-grader,
we would expect the responses to moderate towards 4. Thus, at a somewhat intuitive level,
the only potentially problematic change is that A and B polarize.
In fact, the additional information that Darley and Gross presented to their subjects
was, by design, not so clear-cut. Rather, it was a video of Hannah taking an oral test in
which she answered some di¢ cult questions correctly but missed on some easy questions,
was sometimes seen to be concentrating assiduously but was sometimes distracted. What
conclusion should a subject draw from such mixed evidence? Consider the following three
possibilities:
i Hannahs mixed performance is typical of an average fourth grade student.
ii The fact that Hannah manages to answer some di¢ cult questions and to concentrate
when she wants to, is telling. The easy questions may just bore her. Hannah may not
be the best student, but her level is certainly well above average (say, 4.5 or above).
iii The fact that Hannah misses some easy questions and cannot maintain her concentra-
tion is troublesome, the occasional correct answers on di¢ cult questions notwithstand-
ing. Hannah may not be the worst student, but her level is well below average (say,
3.5 or below).
All three of these conclusions strike us as defensible. To put it di¤erently, while we may
favour a particular one, none of the conclusions in and of themselves seem to be evidence of
biased reasoning, especially given that the experimental subjects were not education experts,
but merely Princeton undergraduates. Actually, we do not need to rely on our own intuition
in this matter, as Darley and Gross ran a control where they asked subjects to rate Hannah
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based solely on the performance video, that is, to rate her without seeing any potentially
biasing demographic information. Subjectsresponses had a mean close to 4, but a signicant
fraction were at least 4:5 and a signicant fraction were 3:5 or below.4 That is to say, many
of the necessarily unbiased subjects interpreted the performance video positively, as in ii),
and many interpreted it negatively, as in iii). Hence, neither a rise nor a fall in response by
either subject A or B would be problematic and, by extension, neither would polarization.
For instance, A and B would unproblematically polarize if A reasons as in ii) above, while
B reasons as in iii), and they reason this way independently of demographic information.
In general, moderation, harmonization and polarization are all consistent with rational
unbiased reasoning. Rather than being surprising, this conclusion is almost tautological 
when a person is presented with equivocal evidence, that is, evidence that can reasonably
be interpreted as being either in favour or against a proposition, his beliefs can reasonably
move either towards or away from accepting the proposition, or not move at all, and, by
that very fact, the harmonization, moderation, and polarization of two individuals are all
reasonable outcomes.5 Actually, even evidence that is not mixed can lead to polarization, as
we discuss later (see Theorem 8, Section 2.2, and Section 5.2). The conditions under which
it is possible for two individuals to polarize has been the focus of much of the theoretical
literature in economics to date, but it is not our main concern.
Even if people can legitimately update in di¤erent directions, a challenge remains. Why
would it be the subjects who believed Hannah to be well-o¤ and who initially rated her
higher, that tended to revise upwards rather than downwards? More generally, why, when
presented with the same information, would subjects on one side of an issue tend to update
in an opposing direction to subjects on the other side? Moreover, why would this opposing
updating be in directions that conrmed the subjectsinitial predispositions? That is, why,
or better yet, when, would there be polarization at the level of the population? This is the
main query that we address in this paper.
In order to answer this question, let us rst consider an experiment by Plous (1991). Using
a questionnaire, he divided subjects into two groups, according to whether they entered the
experiment with a belief that a strategy of nuclear deterrence made the United States safer
4From Table 1 in their paper, the standard deviations for the 3 main dependent measures -Liberal arts,
Reading, and Mathematics) - were .505, .581 and .238. If the scores were approximately normal, around
68% of scores would fall within one standard deviation of the mean. In the case of Liberal arts, the mean
was 4, so 32% of scores would fall outside of the range 3.5-4.5. In the case of Reading, even more would fall
outside that interval, but in mathematics, fewer would.
5Michael Mandler has made the argument to us that if moderation is possible, then, necessarily, polar-
ization is also possible. Essentially, two people who have seen a moderating signal that may or may not be
erroneous (say, pure noise), will polarize if they are later told that the signal turned out to be erroneous.
This claim is also consistent with resullts in Baliga et al. (2013).
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or less safe. He then gave all the subjects the same article to read, which described an
incident where an erroneous alert caused the United States to enter a heightened state of
readiness for nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The crisis lasted only three minutes, as
o¢ cials quickly realized the alert was a false alarm. After reading the article, the subjects
views of nuclear deterrence moved further in the direction of their initial inclinations.
How should the subjects have reacted? As Plous writes, Given the fact that (a) the
system malfunctioned and (b) the United States did not go to war despite the malfunction,
the question naturally arises as to whether this breakdown indicates that we are safer or
less safe than previously assumed.Put di¤erently, the evidence provided by the article is
equivocal, and its implications depend on beliefs about an ancillary consideration, to wit,
whether it is more important for a systems safety that it have a well-functioning primary
unit or that it have e¤ective safeguards.
Plous himself explains why two particular subjects polarizing is not problematic. What
about the population polarizing, is that evidence of bias, as he concludes?
We are told that most of the subjects knew of the false alarm incident before entering
the experiment, though, presumably, they did not know all of the details provided in the
article. In a variant treatment that also yielded population polarization, subjects were given
descriptions of near-missincidents that were unfamiliar to them, rather than descriptions
of an incident they had already heard of. Which subjects would have entered the experiment
with a favourable view of nuclear deterrence? Answering this question reveals the main
mechanism at work in our theory.
A reasonable presumption is that those subjects with a favourable view despite their
knowledge of a previous malfunction, were those who considered the reliability of the safe-
guards to be more important than the reliability of the primary unit. These subjects would
naturally tend to increase their belief that nuclear deterrence is safe after being given further
evidence about well functioning safeguards. At the same time, those who considered a mal-
function of the primary unit to be more dispositive than the quality of the safeguards would
have a negative view initially, and would tend to revise downwards after being given further
evidence about a shaky primary unit. Thus, population polarization is not only consistent
with unbiased reasoning but even to be expected, at least in Plousexperiment. Section 1.1
provides a numerical illustration of this polarization in an example.
The general reasoning is simple. Consider a group of people with di¤ering opinions on an
issue. The available information on the issue has induced favourable views in some people
and disfavourable views in others. Now suppose the group is exposed to an additional piece
of information that is similar in nature to the previous body of information. Those who
previously considered this type of information to be positive will be more likely to respond
favourably than those who previously considered it to be negative.
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Before returning to Darley and Gross, which is not covered by this reasoning, consider
Lord, Ross and Leppers (1979) capital punishment experiment. There, subjects were pre-
sented with a common piece of evidence that was characteristic of research found in the
current literature. Again, it is hardly surprising that those for whom current evidence led to
a favourable conclusion with regards to the e¢ cacy of the death penalty responded positively
to similar evidence.
The specic information that Lord, Ross, and Lepper provided their subjects was two
(purported) studies, one that found that the murder rate tended to be lower in states follow-
ing the adoption of the death penalty and one that found that the murder rate tended to be
higher. Viewed as a single entity, the studies determined that about half the time, a state
that adopted the death penalty subsequently had a lower murder rate and half the time a
higher murder rate.
Why would some people consider this type of data to be evidence in favour of the death
penalty and others evidence against? It is not crucial that we, as analysts, know the reason
why but let us propose one: some people believe that there is a selection issue, whereby
states that adopt the death penalty are states with rising murder rates, and some do not.
For people who believe there is a selection issue, the fact that murder rates drop in half
the states is evidence that the death penalty has a deterrent e¤ect. Indeed, even evidence
that the murder rate increased in all states would not be strong evidence against the death
penalty. Other people believe that states adopt the death penalty according to the politics
of the state, politics that are unrelated to current murder rates. For such people, the studies
provide evidence that the death penalty is not e¤ective, as murder rates seem to rise or fall
independently of its adoption.6
People may be unsure of whether or not selection issues are relevant. Subjects with
the strongest belief in the relevance of selection issues should be the ones who enter the
experiment with the strongest belief that the death penalty is e¤ective. They will also be
the ones who consider the additional evidence provided in the experiment to be the most
favourable and the ones most likely to revise their beliefs that the death penalty deters crime
upwards.
Returning to Plousnuclear deterrence experiment, in it he asks his subjects which is more
important, the fact that safeguards worked or the fact that a breakdown occurred. Consistent
6Di¤erent beliefs in the importance of selection issues is only a possibility that we have provided to
explain the di¤erences in updating. The subjects themselves may have reasoned di¤erently. In Section 5.4
we provide another possibility, based on information from the experiment.
We note that Lord et al. asked their subjects to evaluate the studies presented. Subjects tended to give
(implausible) methodological critiques of the studies that went against their inital views. However, as the
authors note, the fact that subjects answered in this way is probably not very signicant, as the design of
the experiment primed them to.
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with our reasoning, he nds that those who feel that safeguards are more important revise
upwards their belief in nuclear deterrence while those who believe that breakdowns are more
important revise downwards. However, Plousreasoning on this is essentially the opposite of
ours. Our logic can be summarized as: A belief that safeguards are important and evidence
that safeguards have worked in the past has led some people to enter the experiment with a
favourable view of a strategy of nuclear deterrence. These people tend to revise upwards when
presented with additional evidence of safeguards working. Plouslogic is: Some people enter
the experiment with a favourable view of a strategy of nuclear deterrence (for unspecied
reasons). A desire to enhance that view leads them to believe that safeguards are important
and to revise upwards.
In a similar vein, Plous nds a strong correlation between an opposition to nuclear energy
and a belief that the accident at the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl was relevant for the
United States. For him, this is evidence that people assess the relevance of Chernobyl in a
biased manner. Specically, opponents of nuclear energy want to maintain this belief and
so decide that Chernobyl is relevant, while proponents decide that it is not relevant. For
us, the reverse is true or, at least, cannot be ruled out people who feel that Chernobyl is
relevant conclude that nuclear energy is not safe and are thus opponents at the time that
Plous questions them; people who continue to favour nuclear energy are those that believe
that Chernobyl is not relevant.
As we can see, much evidence from attitude polarization experiments is consistent both
with biased and unbiased reasoning. To help disentangle the two hypotheses, consider these
implications of our model.
1. If the common evidence that people are presented with is novel in nature, the popu-
lation should not polarize. The reason is that supporters and opponents will not have
been pre-sorted according to their reactions to this kind of evidence and so there is
little reason for supporters to react more favourably than opponents (see Theorem 7).
Consistent with this prediction, Miller, McHoskey, Bane, and Dowd (1993) nd no
population polarization on the issue of the merits of a¢ rmative action when subjects
are presented with arguments that seem unfamiliar to them (we provide greater detail
in Section 2).
In Darley and Gross (1983), subjects were not in any way pre-sorted for their views.
Arguably, there is no particular reason to expect the group who saw rich Hannahto
interpret a video of a mixed performance di¤erently from the group who saw poor
Hannah, so that we should not expect to see polarization. We discuss this experiment
in some detail in Section 3.1. For now, we simply note that the ndings in this study
can be explained in many ways and that the case for polarization here is not as clear
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as it is usually made out to be. (For instance, Darley and Gross ask their subjects
questions about eight of Hannahs characteristics and do not nd polarization on four
of them.)
2. A population of people who have largely based their initial opinions on very similar
evidence on the issue will be especially prone to polarization, as they will have been
well sorted. In particular, this applies to experts that all have a good understanding of
the current body of evidence on the issue but nevertheless disagree (see Theorem 4).
This is consistent with Plousnding that people who report high issue involvement
polarize the most.
3. Groups with strong opinions polarize more (Theorems 4 and 5). For instance, the
strongest believers in the deterrent e¤ect of the death penalty will be the most likely
to increase their belief and the strongest doubters will be the most likely to decrease
their belief. This is consistent with Plous (1991) and with Miller, McHoskey, Bane, and
Dowd (1993), who nd that subjects with the strongest conviction are more likely to
polarize. In addition, in many experiments, including Lord, Ross and Lepper, subjects
are pre-selected to have strong convictions. On the other hand, Kuhn and Lao (1996)
do not nd that strength of opinion matters.
While we would like to have given predictions that clearly distinguish our model from a
biased-reasoning hypothesis, this is di¢ cult to do, as the broad category biased reasoning
embraces several possibilities. Thus, while on the face of it, it would seem that, in contrast
to 1), biased reasoners should evaluate novel information in a biased manner accepting
evidence they consider to be favorable to their views while rejecting unfavourable evidence 
a contrary argument could be made. For example, people presented with novel evidence may
not have su¢ cient time in the experiment to come up with a satisfactory (to themselves)
reason for rejecting unfavourable evidence. As to biased experts, they may be more emotion-
ally invested and have a greater motivation to act in a biased manner, and hence be more
prone to polarization. We do not immediately see a reason for a biased-reasoning hypothesis
to also imply that any group of people who have seen similar information will be especially
prone to polarize, but neither would we claim that no such reason can be produced.7
1.1 A Simple Example
In this section, we provide a simple numerical example that illustrates population polariza-
tion, using the question of whether nuclear deterrence makes a country safer. In the next
7While we have presented our results in a Bayesian framework, we are interested in the question of bias,
rather than Bayesian reasoning in and of itself. Note that subjects who, say, are guilty of base rate neglect
will be unbiased in a manner consistent with our results, even though they misapply Bayesrule.
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section, we present a general model.
Suppose a nuclear deterrence system consists of two components, a primary unit and a
backup, each of which can be either reliable, r, or (relatively) unreliable, u. Let (r; u) denote
that the primary system is reliable and the backup unreliable, and so forth for the other three
possibilities. The safety of the system depends not only on the reliability of its components,
but also on which component is critical for systems of this sort. If primary units are critical,
then a system is safe provided its primary unit is reliable (say if the primary unit fails too
often, sooner or later the backup will fail to catch it, so the primary unit must be reliable).
Call this, condition P. If, on the other hand, backups are critical, then a system is safe
provided its backup unit is reliable (perhaps initial mistakes are inevitable but it is easier
to catch an error than prevent one, so a reliable backup is all that is needed). Call this,
condition B. People are uncertain which one of P and B holds. An individuals belief on
the matter comes from his information about the determinants of safety for systems of this
type.
Let T indicate that it is true that nuclear deterrence makes a country safer and F that
it is false. It is convenient to describe the world as being in one of four possible states, as
indicated by the following matrix:
T F
B (r; r) ; (u; r) (u; u) ; (r; u)
P (r; r) ; (r; u) (u; r) ; (u; u)
The matrix shows that the state can be BT in one of two possible ways: backups are critical
and both components are reliable, or backups are critical and only backups are reliable. The
states BF , PT , and PF are established in similar fashion. Suppose that, a priori, each
component is reliable with a 50% chance and that backups are critical with a 50% chance,
and all these probabilities are independent. Then each state has a 1
4
probability.
Independent signals emanate about the reliability of the two components. Specically,
if a component is reliable the signal r^ is issued with probability 2
3
and the signal u^ with
probability 1
3
; if a component is unreliable, the signal u^ is issued with probability 2
3
and r^
with probability 1
3
. The pair (r^; r^) can be thought of as a positive signal about the safety
of nuclear deterrence, the pair (u^; u^) as a negative signal, and the pairs (u^; r^) and (r^; u^) as
mixed signals, where the rst element of each pair emanates from the primary unit and the
second from the backup.
A near-miss incident corresponds to the signal (u^; r^). In the state BT , the probability of
receiving signal (bu; br) is given by
P (bu; br j BT ) = P (bu; br j B; u; r)P (B; u; r j BT ) + P (bu; br j B; r; r)P (B; r; r j BT ) = 1
3
.
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Similar calculations for the other states show the likelihood matrix for the signal (u^; r^) to be
Likelihood of (bu;br)
T F
B 1
3
1
6
P 1
6
1
3
Let person is information about whether B or P holds consist of a signal i 2 (0; 1), where
higher values are more likely if B holds, independently of other parameters. (For instance, if
the state is BT or BF the individual samples  from a density B () = 2, while in states
PT or PF he samples from P () = 2 (1  ) :)
Consider a population of subects who have derived their beliefs on nuclear deterrence
from their knowledge of a near-miss incident in the past, evaluated in light of their views
about what is critical to the safety of systems. Those who believe that nuclear deterrence
is probably safe will be those who believe that backups are likely to be critical; those who
believe that nuclear is probably not safe will be those who believe that primary units are
likely to be critical. That is,
P (T j (u^; r^) ; ) > 1
2
, P (B j (u^; r^) ; ) > 1
2
P (F j (u^; r^) ; ) > 1
2
, P (P j (u^; r^) ; ) > 1
2
:
Now suppose the subjects are all told about another near-miss incident; that is, they are
given further evidence that the primary unit is relatively unreliable but the backup is reliable.
This signal is positive for subjects who believe that backups are critical; these are also the
subjects who have an initially positive view of nuclear deterrence. Similarly on the negative
side. Hence, the population polarizes those subjects who believe that nuclear is probably
safe and those who believe it is probably not safe both become more convinced of their views.
That is,
P (T j (u^; r^) ; ) > 1
2
) P (T j (u^; r^) ; (u^; r^) ; ) > P (T j (u^; r^) ; )
P (F j (u^; r^) ; ) > 1
2
) P (F j (u^; r^) ; (u^; r^) ; ) > P (F j (u^; r^) ; ) :
2 Formal Analysis
The essential elements of an attitude polarization experiment, as we see it, are the following.
There is an issue of interest. Subjects have private information about the issue. They are
provided with a common piece of evidence that, in some intuitive sense, bears directly on
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the issue. Subjects also have private information about an ancillary matter, which has little
direct bearing on the issue but a¤ects the interpretation of the evidence.8
The minimal setting that can capture these elements is one in which there is a proposition
about the issue that can take one of two values, say, it can be true or false, and there
is an ancillary matter that can be in one of two states, say high or low. We make the
stark assumption that the ancillary matter, in and of itself, has no direct bearing on the
proposition; that is, information about the ancillary matter alone causes no revision in
beliefs about the main issue.9 Formally, the ancillary matter and the issue of concern are
statistically independent in the prior.
The following is a straightforward Bayesian model (with common priors).
1. Nature chooses true or false for the proposition with probability (a; 1  a) and, indepen-
dently, high or low for the ancillary state with probability (b; 1  b), where 1 > a; b > 0.
Thus, the prior over the possible states of nature is:
Prior
True False
High ab (1  a) b
Low a (1  b) (1  a) (1  b)
(1)
We denote the state space by 
 = fH;Lg  fT; Fg.
2. Each individual receives a pair of private signals (s; ).
(a) The rst element is a signal about the issue drawn from a nite sample space S.
The likelihood matrix for a signal s 2 S is
Likelihood of s
True False
High ps qs
Low rs ts
(2)
where 1 > ps; qs; rs; ts > 0. Although we describe s as a single signal, it can be
thought of as the sum total of the information the individual has about the issue.
8For instance, the evidence on the issue could be data on accidents and near-accidents in nuclear power
plants. The ancillary matter could be the relative importance of primary units and backups.
9Thus, just being told that safeguards are more important for safety than primary systems, without being
given any information on the performance of nuclear power plants, says nothing about whether or not such
plants are safe. Or reading a paper that argues that a particular policy was adopted because of political
reasons unrelated to selection (as in Galiani et al. (2005), who discuss the privatizaton of water in Argentina)
says nothing about the e¤ectiveness of that policy.
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(b) The second element, , is a signal about the ancillary matter. The signal is
drawn from a density H () with support [0; 1] when the ancillary state is high
and from the density L () with support [0; 1] when the ancillary state is low.
We assume that H()
L() is increasing in , so that the monotone likelihood ratio
property is satised, and that lim!1
H()
L()
= 1 and lim!0 H()L() = 0. The last
two assumptions, as well as the assumption that the signal is drawn from [0; 1],
rather than a nite sample space, are for ease of exposition. Note that, just as
the ancillary matter by itself is unrelated to the truth of the proposition, we also
assume that the signal about the ancillary matter is unrelated to the truth of the
proposition.
Subject i , who has seen (si; i), has initial belief about the truth of the proposition
given by P (T j si; i).
3. All individuals observe a common signal c 2 C with likelihood matrix:
Likelihood of c:
True False
High pc qc
Low rc tc
where 1 > pc; qc; rc; tc > 0
Subject is updated belief is P (T j si; i; c).
Denition 2 Consider two individuals i and j who have received signals (si; i) and (sj; j),
respectively, and suppose that P (T j si; i)  P (T j sj; j). The individuals polarize if
P (T j si; i; c) > P (T j si; i) and P (T j sj; j; c) < P (T j sj; j).
The signicance of the ancillary matter is that it can a¤ect the interpretation of a signal.
In the case of interest to us, a change in the ancillary state reverses the impact of a signal 
for instance, if the state is high, the signal supports the proposition, while if the state is low,
the signal goes against it. The condition for this to happen is that the signal be equivocal,
as in the following denition.
Denition 3 The signal c is equivocal if either i) pc > qc and rc < tc or ii) pc < qc and
rc > tc.
We have the following theorem.
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Theorem 1 The signal c is equivocal if and only if either i) P (T j H; c; s) > P (T j H; s)
and P (T j L; c; s) < P (T j L; s) for all s 2 S, or ii) P (T j H; c; s) < P (T j H; s) and
P (T j L; c; s) > P (T j L; s) for all s 2 S. Moreover if pc > qc and rc < tc then i) holds,
while if pc < qc and rc > tc then ii) holds.
All proofs are in the appendix.
 Without loss of generality, from now on we assume that when a signal m is equivocal,
pm > qm and rm < tm. Thus, when the ancillary state is high, an equivocal signal
increases the belief that the proposition is true; when the ancillary state is low, an
equivocal signal decreases this belief.
The next result extends Theorem 1 to beliefs about the ancillary state.
Theorem 2 Suppose c is equivocal. For all s 2 S, there exists an hs such that P (H j s; ) >
hs implies P (T j c; s; ) > P (T j s; ) and P (H j s; ) < hs implies P (T j c; s; ) < P (T j s; ).
For any given signal about the issue, upon receiving an equivocal c, people with a large
belief that the ancillary state is high, revise upwards their beliefs that the proposition is
true, while those with a small belief revise downwards. Although it may not always be
obvious to the researcher what the ancillary matter is, in Plous (1991) it is pretty clear
that the ancillary matter that renders near-misses equivocal is the relative importance of
safeguards and the primary system. Specically, a high state corresponds to safeguards
being more important and a low state corresponds to primary units being more important.
Plous provides somewhat of a direct test of Theorem 2, as he asks his subjects which is
more important, the fact that safeguards worked or the fact that a breakdown occurred
and, consistent with the theorem, he nds that those who feel that safeguards are more
important revise upwards their beliefs that nuclear deterrence is safe while those who believe
that breakdowns are more important revise downwards.
So far, we have analyzed how beliefs about the ancillary matter a¤ect updating. The bulk
of the work on attitude polarization is on how initial beliefs about the issue a¤ect updating.
Subject is previous information about the issue is summarized by si. If the equivocal
common signal that the subject is given in the experiment is typical of existing information
about the issue, as is explicitly the case in many experiments, we may expect that the
subjects previous information was equivocal as well. The next result shows that, in that
case, a person with a high initial belief revises upwards.
Theorem 3 Suppose that s and c are both equivocal. There exists a vs such that P (T j s; ) >
vs implies P (T j s; c; ) > P (T j s; ) and P (T j s; ) < vs implies P (T j s; c; ) < P (T j s; ).
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The reasoning behind this theorem is the following. If a person has observed an equivocal
signal in the past, a large belief in the truth of the proposition indicates a large belief that the
ancillary state is high (Lemma 2 in the appendix). In turn, a large belief that the ancillary
state is high leads to an upward revision that the proposition is true (Theorem 2). Theorem
3 combines these two steps.
Theorem 3 concerns how an individual updates. We now move from individuals to the
population. We begin with some denitions for polarization at the population level. (Formal
statements are given in the theorems, as the denitions are used).
 Given v 2 (0; 1) let P v be the fraction of the population that initially believes the
proposition to be true with probability greater than v and let Pv be the fraction that
initially believes the proposition to be true with probability less than v. We think of
the population as being large, so that we identify the fraction of the population who
have a particular belief with the probability of such a belief arising.
Denition 4 Following a common signal, the population polarizes around v if the frac-
tion of those who initially believe the proposition to be true with probability greater than v
that revises upwards is strictly greater than the fraction with initial belief less than v that
revises upwards, and P v, Pv > 0.
Denition 5 Following a common signal, the population polarizes completely around
v if everyone who initially believes the proposition to be true with probability greater than v
revises upwards and everyone with belief less than v revises downwards, and P v, Pv > 0 .
Denition 6 Following a common signal, the population polarizes everywhere if the
fraction of those who initially believe the proposition to be true with probability greater than
v that revises upwards is strictly greater than the fraction with initial belief less than v that
revises upwards, for all v with P v, Pv > 0.
Denition 7 Following a common signal, groups with the strongest opinions polarize
completely if there are v and v > 1   v such that everyone who initially believes the
proposition to be true with probability greater than v revises upwards while everyone who
believes the proposition to be false with probability greater than v revises downwards, and
P v; P1 v > 0.
Denition 7 is especially important given that there is some evidence that polarization
is more marked between sub-populations with the strongest opinions and many experiments
pre-select people with strong opinions. If groups with strong beliefs polarize completely,
there will be a range of ws and ws such that most people who believe the proposition
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with probability greater than w increase their beliefs, while most people who disbelieve the
proposition with probability greater than w increase their disbelief.
The following proposition follows immediately from the denitions.
Proposition 1 If the population polarizes completely around some v, then the population
polarizes everywhere.
Consider an issue on which various researchers have carried out studies. Each study
provides a signal about the issue. Let s be the signal that is the composition of all these
signals. The signal s represents the body of knowledge about the issue. We dene an expert
as someone who knows s. Experts share the same knowledge about the issue but not nec-
essarily about the ancillary matter. As an example, an expert on real business cycles has a
thorough knowledge of the data on business cycles across time. However, experts disagree
about the economic theory that accounts for this data.
A stylized fact is that during a business cycle, wages move only a little while employment
moves a lot. Although business cycle experts agree on this fact, they disagree on its import.
To simplify a little, Neo-Keynesians take it as a sign that markets do not function smoothly
prices are sticky while freshwater economists take it as evidence that markets func-
tion well, but the supply of labour is relatively at. A future business cycle with similar
movements can be expected to reinforce the opinions of (many of) those on both sides. The
following result, which extends Theorem 3 to populations, formalizes this intuition
Theorem 4 Suppose the body of knowledge about the issue and the common signal are both
equivocal. Then there is a v around which experts polarize completely. Formally, if s and c
are equivocal there is a v such that
P (T j s; ) > v ) P (T j c; s; ) > P (T j s; )
P (T j s; ) < v ) P (T j c; s; ) < P (T j s; )
and P v

= P ( : P (T j s; ) > v) > 0, Pv = P ( : P (T j s; ) < v) > 0.
From Theorem 4, there is a level of belief v such that everyone with belief in the truth
of the proposition greater than v revises upwards and everyone with belief lower revises
downwards. Of course, an experiment will be noisyso that we would not expect to nd
such a perfect separation in practice.
 Although the theorem is stated for experts, it applies to any population who enter the
experiment having seen more or less the same equivocal evidence on the issue. The
assumption of expertise provides one reason that individuals would have seen similar
evidence on the issue.
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The level v in Theorem 4 need not correspond to the dividing line around which
an experimenter checks for polarization. Nonetheless, from Proposition 1, the population
polarizes everywhere, so that polarization will be found regardless of the dividing line that is
chosen. As an example, suppose that the population polarizes completely around v = 0:4,
but the experimenter, who is unaware of the value of v chooses a belief of 0:5 as her
dividing line.10 She will nd that the population polarizes, as everyone who believes the
proposition to be true with probability greater than 0:5 revises upwards while less than
everyone with belief less than 0:5 revises upwards. Moreover, focussing on people with the
strongest beliefs, everyone who believes the proposition to be true with probability at least,
say, 0:7 revises upwards while everyone who believes it to be false with probability at least
0:7 revises downwards. In general, experts with strong opinions will tend to exhibit a high
degree of polarization. These results are in line with Plousnding that subjects with high
issue involvement and with strong convictions display a large degree of polarization.
Consider what happens as a population of experts receives more and more equivocal
information. Although Theorem 4 indicates that the population polarizes at each step,
this does not imply that more and more equivocal information inexorably leads to more
disagreement or that enough information will not resolve an issue.
To understand this, think again about a nding of a lower murder rate in 50% of jurisdic-
tions with capital punishment and a higher rate in 50%: As we have noted, this could indicate
that the death penalty is e¤ective but selection is important or that the death penalty is
ine¤ective and selection plays no role. However, in the rst instance there is no particular
reason to expect precisely a 50=50 outcome, whereas if the death penalty is ine¤ective and
selection plays no role, 50=50 is exactly what one would expect if murder rates uctuate
randomly. As a consequence, repeated 50=50 ndings can eventually lead everyone to agree
that capital punishment is ine¤ective, even if at each step there are extremists who polarize.
We provide a specic illustration of this in Section 5.1 in the appendix.
Theorem 4 concerns a population of subjects with a similar level of expertise. In most
experiments, there will be subjects with varying degrees of expertise. While some subjects
will be well acquainted with the literature, others will have only a brief knowledge of it. If
the issue at hand is controversial, as is the case in most experiments, then even subjects with
10In a typical experiment, a subject is not asked directly for a probability assessment but rather for
a number that is, presumably, related to this assessment (see Section 3 for more on this.) Consider an
experiment in which subjects are asked to indicate the extent to which they believe a proposition by choosing
an integer from  5 to 5. Although one might be tempted to associate the point 0 with a belief of 0:5, this
is far from clear. For instance, consider the propostion that extraterrestials disguised as humans roam the
earth. A person who thinks there is a 20% chance this is true could reasonably be described as someone
with quite a strong agreement, say a 3 or 4. Arguably, the point 0 corresponds better to the average belief
in the population or perhaps the prior, than to a belief of 0:5.
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only a little knowledge will likely have seen equivocal evidence (and know that overall the
evidence is equivocal enough for experts to disagree). The following theorem is for people
who have all previously seen equivocal signals, though these signals may vary.
Theorem 5 Suppose that each persons private signal about the issue is equivocal and that
the common signal is equivocal. Then groups with the strongest opinions polarize completely.
Formally, there exist v and v > 1  v such that
P (T j s; ) > v ) P (T j c; s; ) > P (T j s; ) (3)
P (T j s; ) < 1  v ) P (T j c; s; ) < P (T j s; )
and P v = P (s;  : P (T j s; ) > v), P1 v = P (s;  : P (T j s; ) < 1  v) > 0.
If everyones private signal is equivocal, then groups with the strongest opinions po-
larize.11 On their capital punishment experiment dealing with reported attitude change,
Miller, McHoskey, Bane, and Dowd (1993) nd the most polarization among subjects with
the strongest beliefs. For their part, Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) pre-screen their subjects
and select only those with strong beliefs. On the other hand, Kuhn and Lao (1996) do not
nd an e¤ect of strength of opinion.
It is easy to see that, in addition to groups with the strongest opinions polarizing, there
are belief levels around which the population polarizes. In particular, the (entire) population
polarizes around v and the population also polarizes around 1  v. However, in contrast to
the results of Theorem 4, the population does not necessarily polarize around every v. It
is possible to construct examples where the population does not polarize everywhere if the
various pieces of information on the issue are su¢ ciently dissimilar and the ancillary matter
is su¢ ciently unimportant (see Section 5.3, for an example). On the other hand, when all
the signals are equivocal and have symmetric likelihood matrices so that results are not
being pushed in any particular direction the population polarizes everywhere.
Theorem 6 Suppose that each persons private signal about the issue and the common sig-
nal are equivocal and have symmetric likelihood matrices. Then the population polarizes
completely around the prior belief P (T ) = a. Formally,
P (T j s; ) > a) P (T j c; s; ) > P (T j s; )
P (T j s; ) < a) P (T j c; s; ) < P (T j s; )
and P a = P (s;  : P (T j s; ) > a), Pa = P (s;  : P (T j s; ) < a) > 0.
From Proposition 1, Theorem 6 also yields that the population polarizes everywhere.
11In fact, as shown following the proof of Theorem 5 in the appendix, there is a group of people with belief
in the proposition greater than the prior who all revise upwards and a group with belief less than the prior
who all revise downwards.
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2.1 No Polarization
Miller, McHoskey, Bane, and Dowd (1993) carry out several experiments. In one capital
punishment study the population of subjects polarizes while in an a¢ rmative action study
the population does not polarize. More precisely, in the latter study, subjects whose attitudes
polarize are counter-balanced by subjects whose attitudes moderate, or depolarize, as Miller
et al. put it. In both studies, the common information that subjects are given consists of
two opposing essays.
What accounts for the di¤erent ndings on the two studies? We quote from their paper,
Why did relatively more subjects in [the a¢ rmative action] study report a depolarization of
their attitudes? We have no convincing answer. Subjects may have been less familiar with
detailed arguments about a¢ rmative action relative to the capital punishment issue used in
Experiments 1 and 2. A larger number of subjects were perhaps more informed by the essays
in this study, and, as a result indicated a reversal of their position.Miller et al. do not
explain exactly why subjects would tend to polarize when presented with familiar arguments
but instead be informedand revise upwards or downwards randomly when presented with
novel arguments. Nevertheless, that is what is predicted by our model.
To see this, recall that in a population of people that have (largely) derived their beliefs
on nuclear deterrence from their knowledge of near-miss episodes and their views on the
primary/safeguards question, proponents of nuclear deterrence will tend to be people who
believe that safeguards are most important and conversely for opponents. As a result, when
the population is presented with further evidence of reliable backups, proponents will be
more likely to revise upwards than opponents and the population will polarize. Now suppose
that instead of this type of evidence, the population is presented with the following pair of
arguments, which we call h and l,
h: A strategy of nuclear deterrence by the United States is unsafe because other
countries will develop an inordinate fear that the United States is planning a rst
strike and will be tempted to strike rst themselves.
l: A strategy of nuclear deterrence is safe because other countries will not risk
taking any action that even hints at a provocation.
The combined impact of these two arguments on an individual will depend on how much
weight he places on each of them. There is little reason for these weights to bear any
particular relation to how important the individual believes primary units are compared to
safeguards. Thus, while di¤erent individuals may respond di¤erently to these two arguments,
there is little reason for these responses to correlate with their initial beliefs about nuclear
deterrence and little reason to expect polarization at the population level. Information
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that is equivocal, but equivocal with respect to a dimension that is orthogonal to previous
information, will not cause population polarization.
In order to formalize this reasoning, we need to introduce a second ancillary matter.
Hence, in addition to an ancillary matter with states that take the values H or L, we
introduce a second matter with states that take the values h or l. Nature chooses one of the
states H or L with probabilities b and 1  b and, independently, one of the states h or l with
probabilities d and 1   d. Individuals enter the experiment having seen a signal about the
issue and a signal  = (1; 2), where 1 varies with states H;L and 2 with states h; l:
Denition 8 Signal s is unrelated to signal c if their likelihoods depend upon di¤erent
ancillary matters. Thus, if s and c are unrelated we can write their likelihood matrices as,
say,
T F
Hh ws xs
Lh ws xs
Hl ys zs
Ll ys zs
and
T F
Hh pc qc
Lh rc tc
Hl pc qc
Ll rc tc
The following theorem implies that a population will not polarize when people are pre-
sented with information that is unrelated to the previous information on which they based
their opinions. It says that if the common signal is unrelated to previous information then
people with large beliefs in the proposition are just as likely to revise upwards as people with
small beliefs.
Theorem 7 If signal c is unrelated to signal s, then, for any ! 2 
,
P! f : P (T j s; c; ) > P (T j s; ) j P! (T j s; ) > vg (4)
= P! f : P (T j s; c; ) > P (T j s; ) j P! (T j s; ) < vg :
whenever, P v = P! ( : P! (T j s; ) > v) ; Pv = P! ( : P! (T j s; ) < v) > 0.
Theorem 7 is consistent with Miller et al (1993). Munro and Ditto (1997) investigate
movements in subjectsbeliefs on stereotypes pertaining to homosexuals. They divide sub-
jects into groups according to their level of prejudice towards homosexuals, measured by the
HATH questionnaire, and present them with (supposed) scientic studies on this issue. The
level of prejudice has a statistically signicant correlation with beliefs on the stereotypes,
but this correlation is low. In addition, we speculate that the scientic information in the
experiment is novel in that most individuals form views on homosexual stereotypes without
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knowing that there are studies on the issue.12 As a result, we do not predict polarization
here. The results in the study are mixed with respect to this prediction polarization is not
found on Experiment 1 but is found on Experiment 2.13
We note that, while our basic framework has only one ancillary matter, a second can be
introduced. All our previous results carry through with the understanding that the common
signal and the previous signals depend on the same ancillary matter.
2.2 Individuals polarizing
This paper is primarily concerned with the conditions under which populations polarize. Of
course, a pre-condition for the population to polarize is that two individuals polarize. The
next theorem gives the conditions under which it is possible for two individuals to polarize.
First, we dene a signal as unbalanced if the likelihood of the signal is always greater in
one ancillary state than the other.
Denition 9 The signal c is unbalanced if min fpc; qcg > max frc; tcg or min frc; tcg >
max fpc; qcg.
Theorem 8 A common signal c can cause two individuals to polarize if and only if c is either
equivocal or unbalanced . Formally, there exist initial beliefs P (T j si; i) and P (T j sj; j)
such that P (T j si; i)  P (T j sj; j), P (T j si; i; c) > P (T j si; i) and P (T j sj; j; c) <
P (T j sj; j) if and only if c is either equivocal or unbalanced.
While either an equivocal or an unbalanced signal can lead two individuals to polar-
ize, unbalancedness does not naturally lead to population polarization (see the example in
Section 5.1). Hence, the assumption that signals are unbalanced cannot be substituted for
the assumption that they are equivocal in our previous theorems. Typical experiments on
attitude polarization use common information that is mixed, or equivocal.
2.3 What do responses mean?
In a standard attitude polarization experiment, subjects are not asked for the distribution of
their beliefs but, rather, for a single number that somehow summarizes this distribution. In
the case of Darley and Gross, subjects are asked to place Hannah somewhere on a 27-point
12This is di¤erent from capital punishment, where even someone who has never read a study on the e¤ect
of capital punishment likely knows that i) some jurisdictions have the death penalty while others do not and
ii) the resulting evidence on its e¤ectiveness is mixed (given that there is no general consensus.)
13As we do throughout this paper, we ignore the portions of their experiment that relate to non-factual
questions, specically, general feelings about homosexuals.
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scale from kindergarten through sixth grade. That is, a subject with a presumably non-
degenerate probability distribution over this scale is asked to name a single point. In the case
of Lord, Ross, and Lepper, subjects are asked how much their views change on a scale from
 8 to 8. What exactly does a subjects answer indicate? Somehow, this question is rarely
asked. Perhaps the most obvious possibility (to an economist) is that a subjects response
represents the mean of her beliefs, but there are countless other possibilities, including his
median beliefs. Actually, for attitude polarization purposes, it is not necessary to decide
exactly what a subjects response indicates, only what a change in response means.
Our model restricts the main issue to taking one of two values, true or false. This allows
us to largely avoid the question of exactly how to interpret responses, as every change in
beliefs is a rst order stochastic dominance (fosd) shift. A person whose beliefs shift up in
an fosd sense will revise with a higher number under any reasonable interpretation of what
her answer means, provided that her beliefs change su¢ ciently for her response to change
(in many experiments that nd polarization, a sizable fraction of subjects indicate no change
in belief). Conversely, a person who revises upward must have had an fosd shift up in her
beliefs, since the alternative is an fosd shift down.
If we move to an issue that can take one of n values, then a change in beliefs that causes,
say, the mean of beliefs to rise may cause the median to fall, making it di¢ cult to interpret
the ndings of an experiment. Any theoretical results that demonstrate polarization of mean
beliefs will have limited applicability. On the other hand, any results that show polarization
in the sense that one groups beliefs have an fosd shift upward while another groups have an
fosd shift downwards will be quite strong when there is an fosd shift of beliefs in a certain
direction, almost any reasonable point summary of beliefs will move in the same direction.
Our model can be modied to allow for n values and the results recast in terms of
fosd shifts, at the cost of added complexity. Thus, let the main issue take one of n values
X = fx1; :::; xng , so that the state space is 
 = fH;Lg X: Let the probability of signal s
in state ! be f! (s) ; and say that signal s is equivocal if fHxi (s) is strictly increasing in xi,
and fLxi (s) is strictly decreasing in xi. As an example of a theorem in this framework, let
r = (r1; :::; rn) be any probability distribution over the issue. Then, experts whose beliefs
fosd r are more likely to have their beliefs shift up than experts for whom r fosd their belief.
3 Related literature
One of the clearest statements on polarization is found in Baliga, Hanany, and Klibano¤
(2013), who are interested in the question of when two individuals can polarize. They let an
issue take on many possible values and interpret a rise in a subjects response to indicate a
rst order stochastic dominance shift upwards in her beliefs and correspondingly for a fall in
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response. A constant response, then, represents either no change in beliefs or a change that
is not ordered by fosd. They show that if there is no ancillary matter (to put their result
in our terms), then two individuals whose beliefs have common support cannot polarize.
This result follows from Theorem 8, as assuming there is no ancillary matter is equivalent to
setting pc = rc, qc = tc, and Theorem 8 extends easily to issues that can take more than two
values.14 (Nevertheless, there is a sense in which an fosd shift can occur even without an
ancillary state, as we show in Section 5.2 in the Appendix.) They go on to relate ambiguity
aversion to polarization.
Andreoni and Mylovanov (2012) emphasize that two individuals can polarize if there is
an ancillary matter (in our terms). They are not particularly concerned with the question
of when populations polarize but, rather, are interested in the persistence of disagreement
between individuals and when such disagreement can be common knowledge. Kondor (2012)
shows that two individuals can polarize in a setting in which peoples beliefs about the
beliefs of others are important. Glaeser and Sunstein (2013) show that two individuals with
inconsistent beliefs can polarize.15 Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2009) show that
two individuals can persistently polarize if they disagree about the likelihoods of common
signals.
Rabin and Shrag (1999) conclude that the literature on attitude polarization has shown
that people reason in a biased manner and develop a theory of conrmation bias. Fryer,
Harms and Jackson (2013) show that two individuals can persistently polarize in a model in
which agents are not fully rational.
Many experiments that nd attitude polarization also nd biased assimilation subjects
on either side of an issue both reporting that evidence that conrms their view is more
credible than contrary evidence. As Lord, Lepper, and Ross observe, biased assimilation by
itself is not problematic, as it is rational for a person to have greater condence in a nding
that conrms something she believes than a disconrming nding. Gerber and Green (1999)
show formally that biased assimilation can arise in a Bayesian model with normal signals,
though their model does not allow for unbiased individuals to polarize. In a similar setting,
Bullock (2009) shows that two unbiased individuals can polarize if they are estimating a
parameter whose value is changing over time.
14Of course, their result precedes our theorem.
15All three papers interpret individualsresponses to reect their mean beliefs. In fact, when issues can take
on more than two values, so that changes in expected value are not isomorphic to fosd changes, individual
polarization can arise even in a very narrow setting, as the example in Section 5.2 shows (see also Baliga et
al. (2013) and Dixit and Weibull (2007)).
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3.1 Hannah revisited
Our theory does not particularly predict population polarization in the experiment of Darley
and Gross (1983), since people were not pre-sorted according to their beliefs. It is worth
examining the experiment in a bit more detail. Subjects were asked for their opinions of
Hannahs level on three academic subjects, liberal arts, reading, and mathematics, and on
ve traits, work habits, motivation, sociability, maturity, and cognitive skills. Although this
experiment is typically described as one that nds polarization, of these eight categories,
polarization was only found on four, hardly an overwhelming nding of polarization.16
Leaving aside the negative ndings, the strongest positive ndings of attitude polarization
were on the three academic subjects. Let us be a bit more precise about these results. When
given only demographic information, subjects initially rated wealthy Hannah as slightly
better than poor Hannah on the three subjects, though in two out of three cases the di¤erence
was not statistically signicant. A fair summary is that, overall, the two Hannahs were
rated more or less identically. To quote from the paper, initial estimations of the childs
ability level tended to cluster closely around the one concrete fact they had at their disposal:
the childs grade in school. As Darley and Gross realize, it is a bit odd that the two
Hannahs were rated almost identically, given the advantages that wealthy schools confer
upon their students (and which we might well expect students at Princeton to be aware
of) and given that many studies have shown positive correlations between social class and
school performance. Darley and Gross provide a possible explanation for this: Base-rate
information... represents probabilistic statements about a class of individuals, which may
not be applicable to every member of the class. Thus, regardless of what an individual
perceives the actual base rates to be, rating any one member of the class requires a higher
standard of evidence.
Let us put some numbers to this notion of base rates and a higher standard of evidence.
Suppose that subjects think that, nationwide, a fourth grade student attending a school with
poor resources is likely to be operating at a level of 3.5, while a student attending a wealthy
school is likely to be operating at a level of 4.5. However, there is a 35% chance that any child
is exceptional, that is, exceptionally bad or exceptionally good, and subjects require 75%
certitude to make a judgement of an individual member of a demographic class.17 Since the
75% standard has not been met, initially everyone reports that Hannah is operating at a level
of 4. Now they are shown a video of Hannah that clearly establishes one thing: she is not
16Darley and Gross themselves explain away the negative ndings. While one can debate the merits of their
explanation, there is something a bit awkward when positive ndings are taken as support of a hypothesis
while negative ones are explained away in a paper on hypothesis-conrming bias, no less.
17See Benoît and Dubra (2004) for an example of a model where such a decision making rule arises in a
utility maximizing setting.
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exceptional. The required standard of evidence is now met and subjectsresponses polarize
to 3.5 and 4.5, the levels for the two types of schools. We have obtained unbiased polarization
by modelling Darley and Grossown words, although not in the way they themselves would
choose to model them. Moreover, it is not hard to come up with other ways to obtain
unbiased polarization in this experiment, as it is by no means clear that the same behaviour
should have the same implications for children from di¤erent backgrounds.
In fairness to Darley and Gross, they put their data through various tests to reach their
conclusions of bias and it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the merits of all their
arguments. Nonetheless, at the very least the conclusion that they have found evidence of
biased reasoning is open to doubt.
3.2 Further considerations on the literature
There is a considerable literature on attitude polarization and related phenomena. Unfortu-
nately, it is easy for a casual reader to come away with a distorted impression of this area,
as many papers underplay negative ndings and provide only a supercial analysis of the
experiments they discuss. This is especially true of papers by non-psychologists, such as
ourselves, who tend to have narrow goals when invoking the literature. For instance, papers
that quote Darley and Gross typically do not mention the questions on which they do not
nd polarization (or consider alternate explanations for the positive ndings).
Gerber and Green (1999) review the literature and conclude that the evidence for attitude
polarization is mixed at best. One issue is that attitude polarization is more consistently
found in experiments in which polarization is measured by asking subjects to choose a number
indicating how their beliefs have changed than in experiments in which it is measured by
having subjects choose a number indicating their initial beliefs and a number indicating their
updated beliefs. Miller, McHoskey, Bane, and Dowd (1993), Munro and Ditto (1993) and
Kuhn and Lao (1996)) all nd attitude polarization with the former type of question but
none with the latter. It is not altogether clear what to make of this discrepancy. Another
di¢ culty is that a proper evaluation of experimental results often requires a close reading
of the papers. We have already seen this with Darley and Gross; in this section, we briey
consider two other inuential papers.
Kunda (1987) gave subjects a scientic article claiming that women who were heavy
drinkers of co¤ee were at high risk of developing brocystic disease, and asked them to
indicate how convincing the article was. In one treatment, brocystic disease was character-
ized as a serious health risk and women who were heavy co¤ee drinkers rated the article as
less convincing than women who were light drinkers of co¤ee (and than men). In a second
treatment, the disease was described as common and innocuous and both groups of women
rated the article as equally convincing. Note that in the rst treatment, the articles claim
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was threatening to women who were heavy co¤ee drinkers, and only them, while in the sec-
ond treatment the articles claim threatened neither group. Kundas interpretation of her
ndings is that subjects engaged in motivated reasoning and discounted the article when it
clashed with what they wanted to believe. However, when subjects were asked how likely
they were to develop the disease in the next fteen years, in both treatments women who
were heavy co¤ee drinkers indicated about a 30% greater chance than light drinkers. That
is, although heavy co¤ee drinkers in the serious health risk treatment described the article
as less convincing than in the innocuous risk treatment, they seem to have been equally
convinced in the two treatments. Kunda does not comment on this discrepancy (a chart is
given without comment), but to us it makes the case for motivated reasoning here less than
clear.
Nyhan and Reier (2012) report on an extreme form of polarization, a so-called back-
re e¤ect. As they describe it, subjects were given articles to read that contained either a
misleading statement by a politician or the misleading statement together with an indepen-
dent correction and, rather than o¤setting the misleading statement, the correction backred,
causing partisans to believe the statement even more.
In their rst experiment, all subjects were given an article to read in which Bush justied
the United States invasion of Iraq in a manner that suggested that Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction. For subjects in the correction condition, the article went on to describe the
Duelfer Report, which documented the absence of these weapons. However, the correction
backred conservatives who received a correction telling them that Iraq did not have WMD
were more likely to believe that Iraq had WMD than those in the control condition.
It is worth looking at the actual correctionthat subjects were given and the question
they were asked.
Correction: While Bush was making campaign stops in Pennsylvania, the
Central Intelligence Agency released a report that concludes that Saddam Hus-
sein did not possess stockpiles of illicit weapons at the time of the U.S. invasion in
March 2003, nor was any program to produce them under way at the time. The
report, authored by Charles Duelfer, who advises the director of central intelli-
gence on Iraqi weapons, says Saddam made a decision sometime in the 1990s to
destroy known stockpiles of chemical weapons. Duelfer also said that inspectors
destroyed the nuclear program sometime after 1991.
Question: Immediately before the U.S. invasion, Iraq had an active weapons
of mass destruction program, the ability to produce these weapons, and large
stockpiles of WMD, but Saddam Hussein was able to hide or destroy these
weapons right before U.S. forces arrived  Strongly disagree [1], Somewhat dis-
agree [2], Neither agree nor disagree [3], Somewhat agree [4], Strongly agree [5]
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To us, the so-called correction is far from a straightforward repudiation. First of all, it
acknowledges that, at some point in time, Hussein did posses weapons of mass destruction,
in the form of chemical weapons. It rather vaguely asserts that he made a decision to destroy
stockpiles of chemical weapons, without asserting that he followed up on the decision. It
goes on to say that inspectors destroyed the nuclear program sometime after 1991. But how
di¢ cult would it have been for Hussein to have hidden some weapons from the inspectors?
The question asks if Iraq had the ability to produce these weapons. Even if stockpiles of
chemicals were destroyed, would that eliminate a countrys ability to produce more?
All these issues muddy the interpretation of their ndings. Some readers may think we
are quibbling, but why not provide a more straightforward correction and question such as:
Correction: In 2004, the Central Intelligence Agency released a report that
concludes that Saddam Hussein did not possess stockpiles of illicit weapons at
the time of the U.S. invasion in March 2003, nor was any program to produce
them under way at the time.
Question: Immediately before the U.S. invasion, Iraq had an active weapons
of mass destruction program and large stockpiles of WMD Strongly disagree,
Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree.
In fact, Nyhan and Reier ran a follow-up study in which this is precisely the correction
and question that they used. And with this formulation they did not nd a backre e¤ect.
However, their reason for this alternate formulation was not to test their original nding and
they do not conclude that the original backre e¤ect was spurious. Rather, they provide
several explanations for the di¤erent nding. One explanation starts with the observation
that the follow-up experiment took place a year later and in the intervening year the belief
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction had fallen among Republicans. Notice that
this observation itself belies the notion that polarization is inevitable. Another explanation
acknowledges that the di¤erent result may be related to the minor wording changes.These
do not strike us as minor changes, but our intent is not to enter in a debate here. The
authors report the two di¤erent ndings, as well as another, and they make a case for their
interpretation. What is unfortunate is that others who refer to them typically quote the rst
experiment without even mentioning the follow-up.
We do not doubt that there is a real phenomenon here  indeed, that is why we have
written this paper but it is important to recognize the negative ndings as well as the
positive ones.
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4 Conclusion
Unbiased Bayesian reasoning can lead to population polarization. To some extent, this
should come as no surprise. After all, the di¤erences in opinions between di¤erent schools
of thought be it Neo-Keynesians versus freshwater economists, communists versus fascists,
republicans versus democrats, or Freudians versus Jungians do not result from access to
di¤erent information on the issues they discuss, but from di¤erences in how they interpret
the information. It is hardly surprising when they continue to interpret evidence in di¤erent
ways. Essentially, the schools of thought correspond to the ancillary matters that play a
crucial role in our analysis.
Nonetheless, if reasoning is unbiased there are limitations to the polarization that should
take place. In keeping with this prediction, some experiments do not nd polarization. In the
political sphere, an analysis of Gallup poll surveys across 36 years by Gerber and Green (1999)
shows that the approval ratings of United States presidents by Democrats, Republicans, and
Independents move up and down closely together with a very high correlation in the way
in which partisan groups update their assessments. Moving to Latin America, free market
reforms in the 1990s did not have the large impact on growth that many had promised.
Commentators on the left took this as evidence against the supposed benets of free markets
while commentators on the right concluded that the reforms were not extensive enough to
produce the desired results. Despite new evidence, old disagreements persisted which is
easily explainable as the product of unbiased reasoning. Nonetheless, while the di¤erences
between the left and the right in Latin America run deep, this does not mean that there is
never any convergence on any issue. For instance, where once they disagreed, left wing and
right wing parties in Uruguay now concur that government debts should be paid.18
Where there are persistent di¤erences in political beliefs, it is often not clear what these
di¤erences show about how people reason. Many political questions concern issues where
fundamentals are changing over time, where evidence is hard to come by, where even partisans
are often ill-informed, and where factual discussions are confounded with discussions about
values hardly an ideal setting for a convergence of beliefs (see Bullock (2009) for a further
discussion).
Returning to the question we began with, what e¤ect should we expect evidence of racial
disparities in police stop and frisk rates to have on di¤erent groupsviews of the American
justice system? Surveys show that many white Americans see disparate treatment by the
police as a rational response to di¤erences in crime rates where many black Americans see
a discriminatory police force. The evidence on stop and frisks is consistent with both view-
18See Garcé and Ya¤e (2004) p139 for a speech in 1989 against paying debts by Astori, who later paid
debts as minister of economics and later vice president of the country, during the governments of the left
wing coalition that came to power in Uruguay in 2005.
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points. Indeed, while scholars are quick to cite opinion polls showing disparities in beliefs
between di¤erent racial groups in the United States, most of these disparities have few impli-
cations for Bayesian reasoning.19 Di¤erent racial groups in the United States have markedly
di¤erent experiences and the same evidence interpreted in light of di¤erent experiences may
yield varying conclusions. This does not mean that there is no evidence that should lead
members of di¤erent groups to react similarly. Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss (2007) nd that, not
only were blacks and Hispanics in New York city stopped by police more often than whites
in the late 1990s, they were also stopped more often than whites relative to their respective
crime rates and that stops of blacks and Hispanics were less likely to lead to arrests. While
this data is not devoid of all ambiguity, it can be expected to lead to a greater moderation
of beliefs than simple data on overall stop rates.20
We have not just shown that it is possible to concoct some Bayesian model in which
groups polarize, but that this polarization arises quite naturally. This does not mean that
biased reasoning never occurs. However, a nding of attitude polarization is a long way
from demonstrating that biased reasoning took place. Interestingly enough, the impact that
repeated draws of the same evidence has on beliefs can change over time, without that being
a psychologicalphenomenon (see Section 5.1).
The logic of experiments on attitude polarization is as follows. Subjects with varying
beliefs on an issue are gathered. The experiment does not inquire as to why subjects
beliefs di¤er or whether or not these beliefs are rational to begin with. Rather, it implicitly
accepts that beliefs can legitimately di¤er and recognizes that it is di¢ cult to determine if
beliefs have been rationally derived without knowing the information upon which they are
based. Attitude polarization is about how people update their beliefs in response to a known
piece of information, specically, the direction in which they update. We have shown that,
appearances notwithstanding, this direction is often in accord with an unbiased application
of Bayesrule. We have not addressed the larger question of just how rational people are.
To push the point, consider subjects whose initial beliefs are simply wrong. Perhaps
they stem from an unfounded fear of spiders, a distorted view of how the world works, or
baseless prejudices. The question addressed by an attitude polarization study is, given these
19There may be implications for whether or not di¤erent beliefs are common knowledge and whether or
not rationality is common knowledge, but common knowledge assumptions are extremely (implausibly?)
strong. Moreover, while people who are reasoning in a more or less Bayesian fashion can be expected to
draw conclusions that are more or less Bayesian, smalldepartures from common knowledge assumptions
easily lead to very di¤erent conclusions.
20To a large extent, simple data on disparate stop rates simply conrmed what most people believed
anyway. To say it conrmed what people believed is not to say that it contained no new information, as
it moved these beliefs from being very probably correct to almost certainly correct. However, if anything,
this conrmation is likely to have moved groupsviews on the justice system farther towards their respective
poles.
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erroneous views, do subjects commit an additional error and update erroneously, or do they
behave consistently with the erroneous views they have. Our model suggests that they do
not commit an additional error, or, more precisely, that attitude polarization does not show
they do. At the same time, the fact that a person has beliefs that are largely wrong does
not indicate that he or she is irrational. These beliefs may have been rationally derived from
the information available to the person.
Many scholars have asked what can be done to reduce persistent disagreements among
various groups. Our model suggests that rather than provide people with yet more direct
evidence on the issue at hand, it would often be better to give them information that is only
indirectly related to the issue. Our reasoning is not far from Pascals: When we wish to
correct with advantage and to show another that he errs, we must notice from what side he
views the matter, for on that side it is usually true, and admit that truth to him, but reveal
to him the side on which it is false.(Pensees, translated by W. F. Trotter.)
5 Appendix
5.1 Convergence with Polarization
In this section, we present an example to illustrate that polarization may take place even
as there is growing agreement in a population, as discussed in Section 2. The example also
shows the e¤ect of an unbalanced signal.
Consider the issue of capital punishment. Let i be a nding that the murder rate has in-
creased in a jurisdiction with capital punishment and d a nding that the rate has decreased.
Suppose that i and d have the following likelihood matrices
T F
H 4
5
9
10
L 1
10
1
2
i
T F
H 1
5
1
10
L 9
10
1
2
d
(5)
where H corresponds to selection issues being important and L to these issues being irrele-
vant.21 Suppose the prior over the four states is uniform.
Let C = S be the set of unordered draws from two jurisdictions with capital punishment.
Thus, C consists of three signals, cii, cdd, and cid, where, for instance, the signal cid, indicates
that the murder rate has increased in one jurisdiction and decreased in one. Their likelihoods
21In this example, when selection issues are important jurisdictions that adopt capital punishment have
such sharply rising murder rates that, even if the punishment is an e¤ective deterrent, there is still a large
chance of 45 that the murder rate increases. This feature is unimportant for our immediate purposes but
allows the example to also be used to demonstate the e¤ect of an unbalanced signal.
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are
T F
H 16
25
81
100
L 1
100
1
4
cii
T F
H 1
25
1
100
L 81
100
1
4
cdd
T F
H 8
25
18
100
L 18
100
1
2
cid
Note that cid is an equivocal signal.
Say the existing body of knowledge is s = cid. Consider a population of experts, who
have all seen this signal. They all agree upon the experience that jurisdictions have had with
capital punishment to date but they disagree about the importance of selection issues.
Now suppose they are presented with information from two additional jurisdictions and
that this signal is again cid. The population polarizes completely around an initial belief
of (about) 0:55 that the proposition is true. That is, everyone with an initial belief in the
proposition greater than 0:55 revises upwards upon seeing an additional cid, while everyone
with an initial belief smaller than 0:55 revises downward.
Let us consider what happens as the population is given more and more common informa-
tion. We can model this process as more and more conditionally independent draws from C.
Suppose the actual state of the world is LF , where the modal draw is cid. First consider the
unlikely possibility that every draw happens to be this equivocal signal. Take a person with
initial belief of 0:62 that capital punishment is e¤ective (that is, P (T j s; i) = 0:62). As we
know, after seeing one more instance of cid, she revises upward. For the next six iterations,
her belief continually increases, reaching 0:96. However, at the seventh additional draw, her
belief decreases and continues to decrease from then on. The reason for the downturn is
that, while cid is equivocal, it is most likely to occur in the state LF. Eventually the e¤ect
of this fact dominates and she revises downwards.
Typically, additional draws will not consist of unbroken strings of one increase/one de-
crease, although, in the limit, the data will show that the murder rate has risen half the time
(in the state LF ). For i.i.d. draws, we have the following:
1. Eventually (almost) everyone agrees that the proposition is false and the ancillary state
is low. Formally, let c1 be a sequence of iid draws from C, and ct the rst t draws.
For any , P fc1 : limt!1 P (LF j ct; s; ) = 1g = 1.
2. Eventual harmonization. Initially, two given experts may polarize. Eventually, how-
ever, they will harmonize. Formally, for any ,0, c 2 C,
lim
t!1
P

ct : P
 
T j c; ct; s;  < P  T j ct; s;  and P  T j c; ct; s; 0 < P  T j ct; s; 0	 = 1:
3. While more and more people revise downwards upon seeing an equivocal signal, there
are always extremists who revise upwards. Formally, for all t and ct, there exist vt and
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ht such that P (T j s; ) > vt ) P (T j cid; ct; s; ) > P (T j ct; s; ) and P (H j s; ) >
ht ) P (T j cid; ct; s; ) > P (T j ct; s; ) :
Although the population always polarizes upon seeing a single equivocal signal, as evi-
dence accumulates, more and more people become convinced that the proposition is false and
more and more people harmonize. A typical experiment in the eld starts with a controver-
sial issue with relatively little (good) information, rather than one for which data has largely
resolved the issue. Even on an issue that is largely resolved, pre-sorting of the subjects may
result in the experiment yielding a distorted impression.
Note that the signal cii is unequivocal in both ancillary states H and L, the signal cii
causes a downward revision that the proposition is true that is, for all s, P (T j H; cii; s) <
P (T j H; s) and P (T j L; cii; s) < P (T j L; s). However, the signal cii is also unbalanced,
being always more likely in ancillary state H than L, and it can lead an individual who
is uncertain of the ancillary state to revise upwards. For instance, an expert who initially
believes the ancillary state is high with probability :52 revises upwards. The reason he
revises upwards is that cii increases his belief that the state is high, and in that state his
initial belief in the proposition is relatively large. This expert has an initial belief of :46
that the proposition is true. At the same time, an expert with initial belief of :38 that the
population is true revises downwards, so that the unequivocal cii causes these two individuals
to polarize. However, everyone with initial belief greater than :53 also revises downwards
and the population does not polarize.
5.2 Polarization without an ancillary state
The following example shows that even without an ancillary state, an experiment could nd
that beliefs polarize in an fosd sense depending on the exact question that is asked.
Consider the issue of how safe nuclear energy is. Suppose its safety can be described as a
parameter that takes on the values 1; 2; 3; or 4 (say, 1 means there is more than a 3% chance
of an accident, 2 means a 1 3% chance, etc...), and that, a priori, all four values are equally
likely. Individuals receive private information which is one of four signals with likelihoods:
SA # ! 1 2 3 4
s1
3
4
1
4
0 0
s2
1
8
1
2
1
4
1
8
s3
1
8
1
4
1
2
1
8
s4 0 0
1
4
3
4
Likelihoods
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Suppose that person I sees signal s2 and II sees signal s3. Their updated beliefs are
1 2 3 4
I : p ( j s2) 18 12 14 18
II : p ( j s3) 18 14 12 18
Posteriors
(6)
so that IIs beliefs fosd Is. Now I and II are shown the common signal c with likelihoods
1 2 3 4
c 0 1 1 0
Likelihoods
In this setting, Baliga et al. have shown that fosd polarization of two individuals cannot
occur. This no-polarization also follows from Theorem 8, extended to issues that take on
more than one value. Indeed, posterior beliefs are
1 2 3 4
I : p ( j s2;c) 0 23 13 0
II : p ( j s3;c) 0 13 23 0
Posteriors
(7)
and there is no polarization in an fosd sense. In fact, for both I and II beliefs have neither
risen nor fallen in an fosd sense.
Suppose, however, that the experimenter does not ask subjects for their beliefs over the
four point scale. Instead, the experimenter asks for their beliefs that nuclear energy is safe.
Say that both subjects agree that nuclear energy is safe if it rates a 3 or 4. The beliefs of
the subjects before and after the common signal are
Posteriors after signals
Dangerous Safe
I : s2
5
8
3
8
II : s3
3
8
5
8
I : s2; c
2
3
1
3
II : s3; c
1
3
2
3
Before the common signal, IIs beliefs fosd Is. Following c, IIs beliefs shift up and Is
shift down, so there is polarization in an fosd sense. This example is in the spirit of BHKs
assumptions which guarantee no polarization. As they write, the key to their result is that
conditional on the parameter, all individuals agree on the distribution over signals and
their independence. Here too, conditional on the underlying parameters, all individuals
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have this agreement. However, while the experimenter has asked a natural enough question,
it is (perhaps inevitably) only a function of the underlying parameters and that function
does not have the same properties.
Note that the initial question (where there is no polarization in an fosd sense) shows
that polarization in an expected value sense does not require an ancillary state (or a mis-
calibratedquestion). From equation (6), E ( j s2) = 2:37 and E ( j s3) = 2: 62, while from
equation (7)E ( j s2;M) = 2:33 and E ( j s3;M) = 2: 67.
5.3 Polarization, but not everywhere
The following example shows that the population may not polarize everywhere even if all
signals are equivocal.
Suppose the prior is uniform (a = b = 1
2
) and that the ancillary signal is heavily con-
centrated around 0s such that H()
L()
2 [0:9; 1:1]. Thus, the bulk of the ancillary signals are
not very informative about the ancillary state. Let S = fs1; s2; s3g, where, for "  0, the
likelihood of each signal in each state is
s1
3
7
+ " 3
7
  "
2
7
+ " 4
7
  " ;
s2
4
7
  " 2
7
+ "
3
7
  " 3
7
+ "
and
s3
0 2
7
2
7
0
and let c have likelihood matrix
1
2
1
4
1
4
1
2
Suppose that, as it happens, the actual state of the world is (H;T ) and consider a large
group of subjects that have all seen one signal about the issue. Then, 3
7
of the subjects
have seen s1 and 47 have seen s2. Consistent with Theorem 5, everyone who believes the
proposition is true with probability at least :59 revises upwards and everyone who believes
it is false with probability at least :59 revises downwards.
However, for 0s such that H()
L()
2 [0:9; 1:1], which form the bulk of s, P (T j s1; ) < 12 <
P (T j s2; ). We also have P (T j c; s1; ) > P (T j s1; ) if and only if H()L() > 0:94, while
P (T j c; s2; ) > P (T j s2; ) if and only if H()L() > 1:0: Hence, for v  12 , the proportion of
people with belief greater than v that revises upwards is smaller than the proportion with
belief less than v that revises upwards.
There are three particular features of this counter-example.
1. Although there is an ancillary state, its importance is minimal as almost all the subjects
have very similar beliefs about it.
2. Although the private signals the subjects have seen are equivocal, they are not very
equivocal. For instance, the signal s1 is essentially negative for the proposition it is
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more or less neutral in state H; and it is bad news in state L. By the same token,
signal s2 is essentially positive.
3. Although the private signals are equivocal, they are also quite di¤erent from the com-
mon signal. For instance, in contrast to s1 and s2, the signal c is neither good news
nor bad news for the proposition.
While these three points are each important separately, Theorem 6 addresses 2) and 3)
together, by considering only symmetric signals.
5.4 Lord, Ross, and Lepper revisited
We have argued that di¤erent opinions as to the importance of selection issues could have
caused groups in Lord, Lepper and Ross capital punishment study to polarize. In this
section, we o¤er another possibility, based on evidence from the experiment. Footnote 2 in
the paper reads, in part, Subjects were asked. . . whether they thought the researchers had
favored or opposed the death penalty. . . Analyses. . . showed only that subjects believed the
researchers attitudes to coincide with their stated results.That is, subjects believed that
researchers who found evidence of a deterrent e¤ect also favoured the death penalty and
correspondingly for researchers who did not nd a deterrent e¤ect. What are we to make
of this? Is it that subjects believed that the researchers became convinced by their own
research? That is a possibility, although opposition to the death penalty depends not just
on its deterrent e¤ect. Moreover, the statement that the researchers had favoured the death
penalty suggests that their attitudes preceded their ndings. But then how can it be that
researchersbeliefs always coincide with their ndings? They could be faking their ndings,
or consciously or subconsciously making research decisions that inuence their ndings, or
perhaps only publishing research that coincides with their views of the death penalty. In
fact, if the true data is predominantly in one direction or the other, then only researchers
on one side of the issue need be guilty of distortions. With an ancillary matter of whether
researchers who are to the left politically or to the right are more honest and forthcoming, a
50/50 nding easily leads to polarization in our model. This ancillary matter is in keeping
with the persuasion literature, which notes the importance of source credibility in shaping
beliefs.
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5.5 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose c is equivocal, and assume pc > qc and rc < tc: This holds
if and only if
P (T j H; c; s) = pcpsab
pcpsab+ qcqs (1  a) b =
psab
psab+
qc
pc
qs (1  a) b (8)
>
psab
psab+ qs (1  a) b = P (T j H; s)
and similarly P (T j L; c; s) < P (T j L; s) : The proof that pc < qc and rc > tc if and only if
ii) holds is omitted.
Recall the sign function is dened by sgn (x) =  1 if x < 0; 0 if x = 0, and 1 if x > 0.
Lemma 1 Suppose that c is equivocal and let B be a belief over 
 that assigns strictly positive
probability to every state. There exists B 2 (0; 1) such that sgn [B (T j c; ) B (T j )] =
sgn [   B] for all .
Proof. We have that B (T j c; ) B (T j ) has the same sign as
pcB (TH j ) + rcB (TL j )
qcB (FH j ) + tcB (FL j )  
B (TH j ) +B (TL j )
B (FH j ) +B (FL j )
which, letting g = H()
L()
can be written as
[pB (TH) g + rB (TL)] [B (FH) g +B (FL)]  [B (TH) g +B (TL)] [qB (FH) g + tB (FL)] (9)
Dene
f ()  B (FH)B (TH) H ()
L ()
(p  q) +
B (TH)B (FL) p B (FH)B (TL) q  B (TH)B (FL) t+B (TL)B (FH) r
and note that f () is increasing in . Expression(9) can be written as
M ()  H ()
L ()
f () B (TL)B (FL) (t  r) ;
so that B (T j c; ) B (T j ) has the same sign as M ().
As  ! 0; f () converges to a constant and H()
L()
converges to 0; henceM () converges
to  B (TL)B (FL) (t  r) < 0: As  ! 1; H()
L()
f ()!1; so that M (1) > 0. Since H()
L()
and f () are increasing and continuous, M () is also increasing and continuous and there
exists a unique B 2 (0; 1) such that M (B) = 0: Then, sgn [B (T j c; ) B (T j )] =
sgn [M () M (B)] = sgn [   B] :
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Proof of Theorem 2. Let B = P ( j s) and set hs = P (H j s; B) for B as in Lemma
1. Since P (H j s; ) is strictly increasing in ; we obtain that
sgn [P (H j s; )  hs] = sgn [P (H j s; )  P (H j s; B)]
= sgn [   B] = sgn [P (T j c; s; )  P (T j s; )]
as was to be shown.
Lemma 2 Suppose s is equivocal. Then P (T j s; 0) > P (T j s; ) implies P (H j s; 0) >
P (H j s; ) and P (T j s; 0) < P (T j s; ) implies P (H j s; 0) < P (H j s; ).
Proof. Note rst that
P (T j s; ) = abpsH () + a (1  b) rsL ()
abpsH () + (1  a) bqsH () + a (1  b) rsL () + (1  a) (1  b) tsL ()
=
abps + a (1  b) rs L()H()
abps + (1  a) bqs + (ars + (1  a) ts) (1  b) L()H()
:
We have
dP (T j s; )
d L
H
=
ab (qsrs   psts) (1  a) (1  b)
abps + (1  a) bqs + (ars + (1  a) ts) (1  b) L()H()
2 < 0:
Since L()
H()
is strictly decreasing in , we have that P (T j s; ) is strictly increasing in .
But then,
P (H j s; ) = abps + (1  a) bqs
abps + (1  a) bqs + a (1  b) rs L()H() + (1  a) (1  b) ts
L()
H()
ensures sgn [P (H j s; 0)  P (H j s; )] = sgn [0   ] = sgn [P (T j s; 0)  P (T j s; )] as
was to be shown.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let B = P ( j s) in Lemma 1, and let B be such that
sgn [P (T j c; s; )  P (T j s; )] = sgn [   B] : Dene vs = P (T j s; B) : Then by Lemma
2 we have the second equality below, and by Lemma 1, the fourth
sgn [P (T j s; )  vs] = sgn [P (T j s; )  P (T j s; B)] = sgn [P (H j s; )  P (H j s; B)]
= sgn [   B] = sgn [P (T j c; s; )  P (T j s; )] :
Proof of Theorem 4. The v around which experts polarize completely is given by
v = vs in Theorem 3. Note that because vs = P (T j s; B) for B 2 (0; 1) from Lemma 1,
we have that P vs ; Pvs > 0.
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Proof of Theorem 5. For each s compute B 2 (0; 1) from Lemma 1 with B = P ( j s)
and dene vs = P (T j s; B) : Note that because for each s we have B 2 (0; 1) ; there is a
positive mass of signals  such that P (T j s; ) > P (T j s; B) = vs. We obtain that for
v = maxs2S fvsg, P v > 0: Similarly, for 1   v = mins2S fvsg  v we obtain P1 v < 1. By
Theorem 3
P (T j s; ) > v ) P (T j s; ) > vs ) P (T j c; s; ) > P (T j s; )
which establishes (3). Similarly, P (T j s; ) < 1   v ) P (T j c; s; ) < P (T j s; ) as was
to be shown.
Footnote 11 claims that a group with beliefs greater than the prior revises up. To see this,
just let v = maxs2S fvsg for vs as in the proof of Theorem 5, and v = max fv; ag and note
that since signals are equivocal, there is a positive mass of individuals with beliefs greater
than v; all of whom revise upward.
A similar argument shows there is also a group with beliefs less than the prior all of
which revise downwards.
Proof of Proposition 6. If s and c are symmetric, P (T j s; ; c) > P (T j s; ) if and
only if
ppsabH () + qqsa (1  b) L ()
qqsbH () (1  a) + pps (1  b) (1  a) L () >
psabH () + qsa (1  b) L ()
qs (1  a) bH () + ps (1  b) (1  a)L () ,
ppsbH () + qqs (1  b) L ()
qqsbH () + pps (1  b) L () >
psbH () + qs (1  b) L ()
qsbH () + ps (1  b) L () ,
bH () > (1  b) L () : (10)
We have
P (T j s; ) = abpsH () + a (1  b) qsL ()
abpsH () + a (1  b) qsL () + (1  a) bqsH () + (1  a) ps (1  b) L ()
Letting y = bH()
(1 b)L() , we obtain
P (T j s; ) > a, 1
1 + 1 a
a
qsy+ps
psy+qs
> a,
qsy + ps
psy + qs
, bH ()
(1  b) L () > 1
Hence,
P (T j s; ) > a) bH () > (1  b)L ()
) P (T j s; ; c) > P (T j s; )
and similarly for P (T j s; ) < a.
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Proof of Theorem 7. The prior over the eight states is
T F
Hh abd (1  a) bd
Lh a (1  b) d (1  a) (1  b) d
Hl ab (1  d) (1  a) b (1  d)
Ll a (1  b) (1  d) (1  a) (1  b) (1  d)
(11)
It is easy to check that we can write an agents posteriors as,
posterior after s and  proportional to
T F
Hh afgw (1  a) fgx
Lh a (1  f) gw (1  a) (1  f) gx
Hl af (1  g) y (1  a) f (1  g) z
Ll a (1  f) (1  g) y (1  a) (1  f) (1  g) z
&
posterior after s;c and  proportional to
T F
Hh afgwp (1  a) fgxq
Lh a (1  f) gwr (1  a) (1  f) gxt
Hl af (1  g) yp (1  a) f (1  g) zq
Ll a (1  f) (1  g) yr (1  a) (1  f) (1  g) zt
for some f and g. We have,
P (T j s; )
1  P (T j s; ) =
a
1  a
fgw + (1  f) gw + f (1  g) y + (1  f) (1  g) y
fgx+ (1  f) gx+ f (1  g) z + (1  f) (1  g) z >
v
1  v ,
1  a
a
v
1  v <
gw + (1  g) y
gx+ (1  g) z
Since, P > v , P
1 P >
v
1 v , we have that sgn [P (T j s; )  v] depends on g but not on f .
Similarly
P (T j s; c; ) > P (T j s; ),
fgpw + (1  f) grw + f (1  g) py + (1  f) (1  g) ry
fgqx+ (1  f) gtx+ f (1  g) qz + (1  f) (1  g) tz >
gw + (1  g) y
gx+ (1  g) z ,
fp+ (1  f) r
fq + (1  f) t
gw + (1  g) y
gx+ (1  g) z >
gw + (1  g) y
gx+ (1  g) z ,
fp+ (1  f) r
fq + (1  f) t > 1
so sgn [P (T j s; c; )  P (T j s; )] depends on f but not g.
Therefore, conditioning on sgn [P! (T j s; )  v] does not a¤ect the probability that
P (T j s; c; ) > P (T j s; ), which establishes the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 8. Write j and is initial beliefs as
True False
High ea eb
Low ec ed
js beliefs
True False
High a b
Low c d
is beliefs
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For i, we have
P (T j c; si; i)  P (T j si; i) = pca+ rcc
pca+ qcb+ rcc+ tcd
  a+ c
a+ b+ c+ d
> 0,
0 <
abpc   abqc + adpc   bcqc + bcrc   adtc + cdrc   cdtc 
apc + bqc + crc + dtc
  
a+ b+ c+ d
 ,
0 < ab (pc   qc) + ad (pc   tc) + bc (rc   qc) + cd (rc   tc) :(12)
and similarly for j. First suppose that c is equivocal. For "  0, set b = a = 1
2
 ", c = d = ",eb = ea = " and ec = ed = 1
2
  ". Then P (T j si; i) = a + c = 12 = P (T j sj; j). The right
hand side of expression (12) becomes
a2 (pc   qc) + a

1
2
  a

(pc   tc + rc   qc) +

1
2
  a
2
(rc   tc)
which is greater than 0 for "  0, so that i revises upwards. Writing expression (12) for j,
the right hand side is less than 0 for "  0, so that j revises downwards.
Suppose now that c is unbalanced withmin fpc; qcg > max frc; tcg (the casemin frc; tcg >
max fpc; qcg is analogous and omitted). For "  0, set a = d = 12   ", b = c = ", ea = ed = "
and ec = eb = 1
2
  ". A similar argument to the one above shows that i revises upwards and j
revises downwards.
To show the converse, we argue by contradiction. Assume that c is neither equivocal nor
unbalanced and suppose that for some initial beliefs, i and j polarize. We must then have
that of the four terms in brackets in (12), some are strictly positive and some are strictly
negative.
a) Suppose pc > qc; so that we must nd which of the other three bracketed terms in (12)
is negative.
 If tc > rc the signal is equivocal, contradicting our assumption. So assume rc  tc.
 If tc > pc, we have rc  tc > pc > qc, so that min frc; tcg > max fpc; qcg, and c is
equivocal. So assume pc  tc:
 If qc > rc we obtain pc > qc > rc  tc; so that the signal is unbalanced, contradicting
the assumption.
b) Suppose pc = qc: Of the three remaining bracketed terms, one must be positive and
one negative.
 If pc > tc; if either of the nal two terms is negative (pc = qc > rc or tc > rc), then
min fpc; qcg > max frc; tcg so again the signal is unbalanced.
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 If pc = tc; the two remaining brackets are (rc   pc) ; so they have the same sign and
polarization is not possible.
 If pc < tc; if either of the nal two terms is positive (pc = qc < rc or tc < rc),
then max fpc; qcg < min frc; tcg so again the signal is unbalanced, contradicting our
assumption.
The case pc < qc is analogous.
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